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The metaethics of critical theories
Titus Stahl
I. Introduction
Critical theories have traditionally had an ambivalent relationship to metaethical questions. One of
the few claims that all critical theorists agree upon, beginning with Marx and extending to the later
generations of the Frankfurt School, is that their critical analysis of society is not a form of “applied
ethics”. In other words, such theorists do not first philosophically justify moral principles which are
valid everywhere and at  all times and then, in a second step, apply such principles to concrete
circumstances. As far as they make normative claims about what is wrong with society, these claims
are  not  justified  by  appealing  to  an  independent  moral  theory.  In  contrast  to  contemporary
liberalism, critical theories are instead engaged in “immanent critique” (Stahl 2013a). That is, they
do not depart from philosophical principles or moral intuitions but from normative expectations
endorsed by empirically existing social  contradictions or social  movements and, therefore,  they
believe that they do not need independent moral premises. 
At least for Marx and the first generation of the Frankfurt School, this methodological choice is
based on the belief that moral standards not only are an insufficient basis  for the relevant kind of
critique, but that the very existence of a moral domain in social practice and philosophical discourse
is a symptom of something that is wrong with current societies. First, they assume that societies
form a totality, that is, a whole in which everything is only fully comprehensible if one understands
its function within this whole. The conceptual structures that govern our thinking are part of this
social whole and do not remain unaffected when the social totality is one of domination. Any form
of thinking, including moral thinking, will mirror the oppressive structure of society and thus will in
some sense be defective. Second they agree that we cannot simply use moral standards to evaluate
society if  we understand morality  as part  of a  social  totality.  If  moral  standards are shaped by
society, they do not provide an appropriate point of departure for critique. Although later critical
theorists such as Habermas and Honneth reject the idea of society as a totality and consequently
also the negative view of morality that results from it, they still subscribe to a more modest version
of the same claim: Because they continue to see the very existence of the domain of the moral as a
result of the historical evolution of social practices, they also tend to offer analyses of morality in
terms of a more basic social theory, rather than themselves engaging in moral theorizing.
Consequently,  critical  theories  often  take  up  an  external  perspective  towards  moral  discourse,
treating its existence as a social fact to which their insights could be applied rather than using moral
claims to make their normative arguments. Of course, this does not preclude theorizing about the
meaning of moral language or the structure of moral motivation (although, other than Habermas,
critical theorists have rarely engaged in such projects systematically). But an external perspective
on morality that does not  engage in  moral discourse, but instead merely describes its function, at
least  need  not  consider  the  metaphysical  worries  about  moral  properties  and  moral  facts  very
pressing that are at the center of contemporary analytic debates about metaethics.
It is not completely clear, however, that this rejection of morality is consistent with the evaluative
stance of critical theory. Critical theorists by no means remain normatively neutral about society:
they provide normative arguments for social change that, at least on the surface, look very much
like moral arguments (Finlayson 2009, 15). This leads to two questions: First, can critical theorists
make plausible that the normative considerations they advance to criticize society are not moral
considerations? And what understanding of “morality” is presupposed when they make that claim?
Second, if critical theories make normative claims, can they draw on a metaethical theory (even if it
does not concern moral judgments in a narrow sense) that can help us to understand how these
claims can form the basis of a radical critique of society while still being compatible with the idea
that  all  forms  of  normative  discourse  are  part  of  a  social  totality  that  might  be  substantially
deformed by oppression and domination? 
While the claim concerning the embedding of normative discourse in a social totality suggests to
many  some  form of  moral  relativism,  the  aspiration  of  critical  theories  to  transcending  moral
critique seems to necessitate a commitment to some kind of objectivity in the moral domain that is
impossible to square with such an understanding. In order to more make sense of the relationship
between  critical  theories  and  morality,  this  chapter  will  take  a  close  look  at  the  metaethical
commitments of the major critical theorists (Marx, Adorno, Habermas and Honneth) in the light of
their explicit discussions of morality, in order to find out whether we can make sense of the claim
that critical theories develop a fundamental normative, but non-moral critique of society.
II. Marx: Social Practice Expressivism
Many  of  Marx's  interpreters  have  struggled  with  his  seemingly  paradoxical  attitude  towards
morality (Wood 1981; Shaw 1981; Lukes 1985; Peffer 1990): On the one hand, Marx denounces
capitalism using a rhetoric that can hardly be described as anything but moral. On the other hand,
Marx is not only famously dismissive of moralism (Nielsen 1989, 117)– that is, towards forms of
social critique that take moral proselytizing as their most important task – but also towards morality
itself (Rosen 2000). On his version of the totality claim, he frequently characterizes morality as a
mere epiphenomenon of social life, as part of the ideological “superstructure” of society, as a form
of ideology, as a mere expression of particular class interests  and as something that presents a
distorted view of reality (Marx and Engels 1976b, 36; Marx and Engels 1976a, 477,504). Such
remarks suggest that Marx did not think that moral beliefs could reflect valid practical reasons. But
if truly all moral beliefs are ideological in this sense, Marx should have also accepted that his own
moral beliefs do not reflect valid reasons. And this seems implausible.
As a response to this dilemma, it has been widely suggested that Marx merely offers a sociological
hypothesis when he talks about morality as an ideology, to the effect that morality tends to reflect
particular interests of particular classes (Nielsen 1989, 37,109,122). Of course, Marx's story about
the  causal  origins  of  morality  is  likely  to  raise  suspicions  about  the  idea  that  moral  beliefs
straightforwardly reflect some independent reality. Nevertheless, such causal claims do not rule out
the possibility that at least some moral beliefs – and, in particular, beliefs in moral platitudes such as
“causing unnecessary pain ought to be avoided” – reflect moral facts (Nielsen 1989, 35). Thus, as a
mere sociologist of morality, Marx need not have been committed to immoralism on a metaethical
level.
The defenders of the immoralist interpretation, however, cannot be satisfied with this response. This
is because Marx not only makes the trivial claim that moral beliefs can be sociologically explained,
he also claims that they very idea of morality is in some sense mistaken. In the German Ideology,
Marx suggests that defenders of morality must be committed to the idea that moral principles can be
justified without reference to any actual or potential social practice (Marx and Engels 1976b, 419–
20).1 This idea is precisely what he thinks is the essence of ideological thought (Marx and Engels
1976b, 30). An ideological belief is thus a belief that purports to be more than an expression of the
historical reality of human beings.
To  better  understand  the  relation  between  this  critique  of  morality  and  Marx's  normative
pronouncements, it is worth examining Marx's theory regarding its metaethical commitments. One
potential misunderstanding in this context, however, must be avoided from the beginning: many
authors who defend an interpretation of Marx as a moral thinker take a moral relativist reading of
Marx as the primary alternative to such an interpretation (Shaw 1981, 23ff; Nielsen 1989, 37; Peffer
1990, 269ff).  Such a relativist  interpretation would ascribe to Marx the belief  that every moral
statement (such as “one ought to always respect other people's property”) is only true for some
societies  but  not  for  others  (Fisk 1980).   However,  not  only is  there little  evidence that  Marx
entertained any relativist ideas, but it also does not follow from his characterization of morality as
an ideology. On a relativist reading, the only thing that would be false or defective about ordinary
moral beliefs would be the implied claim that such beliefs reflect judgments that have absolute
validity. Once people understand that their moral judgments are not valid absolutely, but only in
relation to their society, a relativist ought to describe their moral beliefs as appropriate. Clearly this
is not an idea that Marx would have held.
1 There have been several attempts to distinguish morality from broader normative concerns in Marx using other 
criteria (Miller 1984, 16; Wood 1981, 128), but this seems to be clearly what Marx finds most objectionable about 
morality.
There are two alternative metaethical options that fit better with what Marx actually says: the error-
theory  and  anti-realist  expressivism.  Put  briefly,  the  error  theory,  claims  that  it  is  part  of  the
meaning of moral vocabulary that one uses such vocabulary to express beliefs about moral facts that
entail an 'unconditional ought' (Mackie 1990, 29). However, according to the error theorist, there
are no such facts. Thus, all positive moral claims are false. If we similarly take the meaning of
moral judgments to be partly constituted by the fact that they aim to refer to moral facts that are
independent of any social context, then it is likely that such an error theory is something that Marx
would have endorsed. Such an interpretation hides, however, the complexity of his position towards
morality. He certainly did not believe that moral judgments are simply untrue.
The overall spirit of Marx's treatment of morality is more consistent with a version of expressivism
that focuses not on individual statements but on forms of discourse. Expressivists in metaethics hold
that the function of moral language is not primarily to describe facts but rather to express feelings,
attitudes  or  commitments  (Blackburn  1984).  While  metaethical  expressivists  in  contemporary
analytic philosophy assume that moral judgments express the mental state of the speaker (such as
the acceptance of a rule), Marx, following Hegel in this respect, is not concerned with individual
linguistic utterances. He rather focuses on the way in which the  structure of the dominant social
practices of a society finds expression in its (moral) forms of thinking. When Marx talks about right
and morality as ideologies, he draws attention to the structural similarity between forms of thought
and  actual  social  reality  –  for  example,  he  argues  that  bourgeois  right  with  its  emphasis  on
individual interests mirrors the individualism of actual social life under capitalism. While he also
often describes causal connections, the argument (most notably in the German Ideology) is that the
forms of thought that are dominant in the self-understanding of any given society are nothing more
than an expression of the dominant forms of social interaction in that society  (Marx and Engels
1976b, 31, 36).
The following idea might be helpful to make sense of this point: any social practice that human
beings  collaboratively  engage  in  must  be  guided  by  some  concerns  or  goals  that  allow  for
distinctions between different kinds of objects and actions and between different outcomes (Taylor
1985,  33–4;  Rosen  2000).  These  practical  distinctions  find  their  expression  in  conceptual
distinctions that people use when attempting to make sense of their practices. Marx seems to claim
that the descriptive and normative concepts dominant in the self-understanding of a given society
always express distinctions that have a role in the wider practical contexts of that society. Marx tells
us in The German Ideology that language playing such an expressive role is unavoidable (Marx and
Engels 1976b, 36, 44). Thus, language and thinking are not, already as such, “ideological”. The
concept  of  ideology  only  applies  to  forms  of  thinking  that  deceive  about  their  expressive
relationship to practices. In this sense, a term like “morally right” can become ideological once
people  interpret  it  to  refer  to  practice-independent  standards,  rather  than to  express  a  practice-
dependent distinction between different kinds of acts.
How can we explain the existence of this kind of ideological deception? Marx assumes that, as a
result of the historical development of the division of labor, the intellectual functions of planning
and conceptualizing become increasingly divorced from physical labor  (Marx and Engels 1976b,
40). This need not be problematic as long as it is understood by all participants in any cooperative
context  that  intellectual  activities  are  to  be  understood  as  a  part  of  the  broader  process  of
cooperative labor. Historically, however, the division of intellectual and manual labor has always
led to  forms of  class  domination  that  then presented  themselves  as  something “natural”. Marx
claims that in all class societies, the rules of discourse tend to mirror this feature of domination. In
particular, the foundations of authority tend to be understood in a way that makes it seem as if the
domination of a social elite over the labor process of subordinated classes stems from a source
independent of it. The use of concepts, ideals or “ideas” that can be used to express and legitimize
authority (“duty”, “truth”, etc.) become governed by rules that no longer allow speakers to treat
these concepts  as a  mere expression of concerns bound to cooperative practices (Stahl  2013b).
Instead, according to the rules of the discursive game of ideology, one must treat such concepts as
practice-independent and thus eternally valid.
This allows us to see why Marx need not have a problem with normative judgments while rejecting
moral  judgments. On this model, normative judgments can be understood as an expression of an
individual's attitude towards a practical question that is only intelligible as part of a wider context of
cooperative  activity  in  which  certain  norms  and  goals  are  presupposed.  Such  judgments,
furthermore, also express an endorsement of those norms and goals and of the rules that regulate the
use of the normative concepts used in the judgment.  Moral discourse is governed,  in contrast, by
rules that prohibit treating moral distinctions as bound to practical concerns. These rules thus mirror
an underlying structure of domination. By using moral concepts, one not only takes up a normative
stance  towards  a  specific  practical  question  but  one  also  implicitly  endorses  rules  that
systematically distort or mislead about the true nature of the very concepts that one uses. On this
account, it is clear that Marx did not think of moral claims as straightforwardly false in a descriptive
sense  but  as  false  in  the  sense  that  one  cannot  make  them  without  endorsing  a  deceptive
understanding of the relation between language and society.
We can best understand Marx's rejection of morality, I have argued, if we take him to subscribe to a
practice-expressivist theory of normative judgment. It is important to note that such an expressivist
view  does  not  entail  relativism  or  subjectivism  as  many  contemporary  expressivists  argue
(Blackburn 1999): One can reasonably express one's commitment to the idea that some practical
question within a social practice should be answered in a certain way (e.g. that workers should be
given  the  full  results  of  their  labor),  without  being  committed  to  the  idea  that  other  people's
differing commitments are equally valid, as long as one is also committed to also disapproving of
those commitments and all the reasons that lead to them. One can even make sense of the idea of
universal  and  objective  commitments  in  expressivist  terms  if  one  assumes  that  by  using  that
language, one commits oneself to the belief that  any acceptable  social practice will pose certain
questions and if one endorses only one (and always the same) acceptable answer to these questions.
None of this requires one to “moralize” in the sense that one has to believe or to advertise one's
practical judgment to reflect practice-independent facts.
It must be admitted, finally, that the definition of morality that is presupposed in Marx's argument is
implausibly  narrow.  It  is  completely  compatible  with  Marx's  view to  say  that  equality,  human
dignity and self-realization are fundamental moral goods in a wider sense, as long as one concedes
that the meaning of such terms can only be correctly understood when we acknowledge that human
dignity,  equality  and self-realization are  important  because they  answer to  distinctive  problems
within human practices and that their import must therefore always be accounted for in terms of
such practices.
II. Adorno: Negativist Expressivism
While the first generation of the Frankfurt School to some degree subscribes to and further develops
Marx's idea that forms of thought are expressions of forms of social cooperation, there is very little
evidence on exactly how this relates to Marx's critique of morality.  In the case of Adorno, it is
rather  clear that  he never pretends  not  to  make moral judgments.  Most  famously,  he argues in
Negative Dialectics that a “new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree
mankind: to arrange their  thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz  will  not  repeat  itself,  so that
nothing similar will happen.” (Adorno 1973, 365) He even sometimes seems to suggest that we can
perceive the ethical import of certain situations directly, especially in cases of human suffering and
thus non-inferentially acquire knowledge about what we ought to do if we want to live an ethical
life (O’Connor 2013, 139). 
Such clearly moral claims stand in tension with other remarks he makes. For instance, he suggests –
like Marx, but for different reasons – that the very project of morality is problematic. As he states in
a famous passage from Minima Moralia, “wrong life cannot be lived rightly.” (Adorno 2006, 39)
Under the conditions of late capitalism or even totalitarianism, there is simply no way to live one's
life in an ethically correct way. Thus, any individual attempt to extricate oneself from such practices
must  fail.  This  also means that  any philosophical  attempt to  formulate  moral  principles  has  to
operate under the (false) assumption that individuals are in charge of their lives. Of course, this
rejection of moralizing – that is often called “ethical negativism” (Jaeggi 2005, 72) – does not entail
that one must reject the idea of morality. On the contrary, it seems as if the claim that moral action
is impossible under current conditions requires one to be able to distinguish the morally right from
the morally wrong and thus requires some form of moral knowledge (Freyenhagen 2013, 209ff).
But  Adorno  holds  that  morality  is  not  only  practically  pointless,  he  also  claims  that  we  are
systematically unable to determine what the morally right alternative could be. This is  because
moral  philosophy  embraces  a  form of  thinking  –  what  Adorno calls  “the  identifying  mode  of
thinking” (Adorno 1973, 147) – that plays an essential role for the permanence of oppression in
modernity.
According to Adorno, identity thinking is a way of understanding the relation between the concepts
that human beings have to inevitably use and the particular objects, persons or situations that they
attempt to grasp by using such concepts. It is characterized by the implicit assumption that we can
understand everything important or essential about the world (including ourselves) by coming to a
conceptual  understanding  of  its  phenomena,  or,  in  other  words,  by  subsuming  any  given
phenomenon under some concept (O’Connor 2004, 18). This is problematic because it denies that
there could be anything about a given phenomenon that exceeds the grasp of the relevant concepts.
Identity thinking is more than an accidental mistake that we could avoid by endorsing the right
theory  about  concepts.  It  rather  results  from a  more  encompassing  historical  dynamic.  Adorno
traces the origins of conceptual thinking back to the attempt to control nature. Human control over
nature  always involves  the attempt  to  bring the  potentially  overwhelming experience  of  nature
under control  by subsuming it  under concepts.  By constructing conceptual schemes that  enable
deductive inferences that allow for systematic technical control of the world, we can discover true
generalizations about natural phenomena that allow us to efficiently deal with particular situations.
This development enables a process of technical and social rationalization of human engagement
with the world, leading to progressive increase of technical control over nature (Horkheimer and
Adorno 2002). The precondition for such rationalization is, however, the dominance of a system of
abstract concepts in human thinking that grows more and more encompassing. Adorno's crucial
argument is that this process is simultaneously one of liberation and domination: Increased control
over inner and outer nature indeed enables human beings to autonomously structure their lives. But
the negation of the possibility that conceptual thinking might never completely capture its object
also leads to a gradual impoverishment of human experience. Moreover, the way in which the social
project of establishing human control over nature in fact plays out does not lead towards social
liberation.  It  involves  a  social  organization  of  labor  power  that  requires  individuals  to  subject
themselves to always larger systems of social control. This link between conceptual domination of
nature, psychological repression of inner nature and social domination represents a more radical
version of the totality thesis. In contrast to Marx, Adorno does not think of social domination as a
deformation of an otherwise neutral cooperative activity, but as part and parcel of a way of relation
to the world that is oppressive through and through.
However, he does not take this as an occasion to dismiss conceptual thinking  per se  – rather he
contrasts  identity thinking (conceptual thinking that  is  unaware of its  distorting character)  with
“thinking in constellations”, i.e., a form of thinking that acknowledges that every conceptualization
fails  to  do  justice  to  its  object  and  instead  approaches  approaching  any  phenomenon  with  a
multiplicity of interrelated concepts, each of which is applied with the conscious awareness of it as
not being fully adequate (Adorno 1973, 162; O’Connor 2013, 17).
This critique of identity thinking is also central to Adorno's theory of morality. He takes Kant –
namely this means Kantian constructivism – to be the most promising option for moral philosophy.
The reason for  this  is  that  Adorno follows the  Kantian  and Hegelian  tradition  in  rejecting  the
possibility of any immediate relation between subject and object that is not mediated by concepts,
that  is,  any idea of a  “given” in Sellars's  sense,  or,  as Adorno would have put  it,  any idea of
“immediacy”. In the moral case, Adorno cannot seriously consider the possibility of non-inferential
knowledge of “moral facts” in the sense in which such knowledge is often postulated by moral
realists (Adorno 2002, 110; Bernstein 2001, 245; Jaeggi 2005, 73).
That does not mean, however, that he has to accept the picture of normativity that constructivists
presuppose (O’Connor 2013, 152). Constructivism is committed to the claim that we can only act
morally if we follow correct moral principles. Even though moral agents need not necessarily apply
such principles consciously, a complete understanding of morality nevertheless requires knowledge
about such principles and has to make use of the correct conceptual framework. If the relevant
framework indeed is correct, it captures everything that morally relevant about any given situation.
It is clear that, on such a description, constructivism commits the mistake of identity thinking.
But if Adorno rejects both constructivism and non-constructivist realism, it is no longer clear that
there is  any  metaethical view that could satisfy the desiderata of Adorno's theory. Of course, in
principle, Adorno could endorse a form of the error theory by advocating for an anti-particularist,
“generalist” claim on the level of semantics (all moral judgments express beliefs in the correctness
of moral principles) and a particularist claim on the substantive level (no moral principle is correct).
However,  on  such  a  theory,  it  would  be  inconsistent  to  claim  that  we  can  make  true  moral
judgments about the badness of acts or situations (Freyenhagen 2013, 7). Thus, an error theory
would undermine his ethical negativism.
But just as in Marx's case, there is a way out of this apparent inconsistency that emerges once
Adorno's reasons for rejecting moral philosophy become fully clear: Adorno's characterization of
morality assumes that we have to understand judgments that involve moral categories (such as
“torturing innocents is unjust”) as judgments that not only express the subject's evaluation of a
situation,  but  also  as  expressing  a  second-order  commitment  to  the  idea  that  the  normative
significance of the situation is exhausted by the fact that it is described in this way. Such a second-
order commitment is, however, clearly not involved in the particular, negative ethical judgments
that Adorno himself endorses. For instance, the judgment that the torture of prisoners should stop
does not commit one to the view that the reasons for why it should stop can be spelled out using
general  principles.  As  a  negative  judgment,  it  need not  refer  to  any  procedure  of  determining
reasons (Freyenhagen 2013, 203). It rather reflects an attitude of rejection towards any principle that
would allow for the torture of prisoners.
However, it must be noted that this still does not mean that Adorno wants to endorse a model of the
non-inferential perception of reasons as the source of authoritative moral claims or to treat such
reasons as normative “givens.” Non-inferentially arrived-at claims concerning the wrongness of
particular  situations  can  still  be  discursively  defended  and  justified  by  mobilizing  different
conceptual  descriptions  and bringing them into  “constellations”,  without  taking any conceptual
description as essential, primary or exhaustive. In contrast to moral particularists, Adorno believes
that  the vindication of  non-inferential  negative  judgments  is  only possible  in  terms of  general,
universal concepts. In contrast  to “generalist” moral constructivists,  Adorno does not think that
general principles are the source of moral normativity, at least not in the situation of late capitalism.
Because all concepts, according to Adorno, must be understood as rules that shape our access to the
relevant domain, I would like to suggest, again, that we can read Adorno as embracing a certain
expressivist  notion  of  moral  discourse  –  however,  with  the  addition  of  an  important  realist
component (Stahl forthcoming). While Marx assumes that we should reject the self-understanding
of traditional morality based on an insight into the relation between practice and morality, Adorno
assumes  that  the  negation  of  identity  thinking  has  to  stem  from  the  philosophical  (and  thus
conceptual) insight into the deficiency of identity thinking in conjunction with an openness to the
deliverances  of  non-inferential  moral  perception.  For  this  reason,  one  could  call  Adorno  an
expressivist that also endorses a negative realism about morality.
Habermas: A Socialized Constructivism
Habermas's perspective on morality differs in two crucial respects from both Marx and Adorno.
First,  Habermas does not  share their  skepticism towards modern morality  but instead is  deeply
committed  to  the  emancipatory  potential  of  modern  morality.  Second,  Habermas  engages  with
metaethical questions to a much larger degree than any other figure in critical theory. In his writings
on discourse ethics, he commits himself to a cognitivist-constructivist view of morality that seems
incompatible with the broadly expressivist commitments of Marx and Adorno that I have sketched
so far (Habermas 1990, 57). But as I will argue, the disagreement might be less deep than it seems.
In  particular,  if  one  reconstructs  the  precise  contours  of  his  constructivist  project,  one  finds
Habermas struggling with the same problems regarding the relationship between social practice and
moral principles that we find in Marx and Adorno. Although this is not intended to downplay that
obvious and significant differences in approach, it might make sense to read even Habermas' work
as a part of this tradition.
The metaethical basis of discourse ethics is to be found in Habermas's theory of communication.
Put  briefly,  Habermas  claims  that,  within  the  broader  practical  context  of  human  linguistic
interaction,  there  is  a  specific  practice  of  communicative  action  which  is  characterized  by  the
willingness  of  participants  to  coordinate  their  actions  by  reaching  understanding  through  the
exchange of speech acts. The relevant kinds of speech acts are those that raise validity claims. Any
given speech act potentially raises validity claims regarding its truth, its rightness, and its expressive
sincerity  (Habermas  1984,  I:20ff).  In  genuinely  communicative  interaction,  it  is  only  the
acceptability  of  validity  claims  that  structures  the  interaction,  rather  than  threats  or  violence
(Habermas 1984, I:295).  Such interaction,  however, is not just  one possible form of interaction
amongst others. According to Habermas, all other forms of linguistically mediated interaction –
such as strategic interaction – depend on an understanding of speech acts that always implies at
least the counterfactual possibility of communicative interaction (Habermas 1984, I:288).
This leads to the following analysis of the moral domain: if we want to know anything about the
meaning of moral statements, we should not focus on their strategic or otherwise insincere use but
on their communicative employment. That is, we should ask what kind of validity claim they raise
and how such a validity claim can be justified. In contrast to non-cognitivists, Habermas insists on
taking the claim-like surface structure of moral utterances seriously (Rehg 2011, 119). In contrast to
realist cognitivists, however, Habermas does not think that moral judgments can be true in a sense
that is discourse-transcending (Finlayson 2005). But they can be intersubjectively acceptable which
still allows for objectivity in the sense of them being valid independent of any particular speaker's
judgment. In particular, moral judgments are part of a domain of discourse that is governed by rules
that determine what counts as a valid argument in such a discourse. Habermas further develops this
thought by introducing the well-known  universality  and  discourse  principles (“U” and “D”) that
regulate the acceptability of normative and moral validity claims, respectively (Habermas 1990).
While his precise argument for these principles is not central to the question pursued here, it is
important to note that these principles presuppose a very specific definition of the domain of the
moral.  According  to  Habermas,  “morality”  (in  contrast  to  ethical  and  pragmatic  questions)  is
concerned with universally  and unconditionally  binding norms that  serve the social  purpose of
regulating the pursuit of and securing the social respect for universal human interests (Rehg 2011,
122; Cooke 1997, 150ff). It can hardly escape notice that this describes those features of morality
that Marx and Adorno took as a reason to reject it – in particular, the idea of moral discourse as
having a logic that is independent of that of other practices and the idea of moral judgments as
having some form of foundational justification. While this seems to put Habermas methodologically
as well as substantially at odds with Marx's and Adorno's critique of morality, it is important to note
that Habermas retains three features that are also distinctive for the forms of normative judgment
that they want to preserve: first,  the idea of a link between morality and social  practice that is
central  to  the  idea  of  morality  as  part  of  a  social  whole;  second,  a  historical  account  of  the
development of the idea of morality; and third, a place for the critique of the ideological nature of
(certain) forms of morality.
Regarding to the first point, it has to be noted that Habermas agrees with the critical theory tradition
that the vocabulary we use in moral discourses, and consequently the form of moral judgments, can
be understood as an expression of features of an underlying practice – in this case, of a practice of
communication.  But  in contrast  to Marx and Adorno, he rejects  the idea of an undifferentiated
“totality” (Habermas 1984, II:339) – that is, the idea that such a practice is only  one aspect of a
whole of social reproduction and thus can be completely deformed by the dominating features in the
sphere of instrumental cooperation. He rather assumes that the spheres of communicative action and
strategic-instrumental  cooperation  are  subject  to  two  intertwined,  but  independent  logics  of
rationalization and that we should analyze the pathologies of modernity not as the result of one
pathological  process  of  rational  domination,  but  rather  as  the  encroachment  of  an  oppressive
rationalization  of  instrumental  cooperation  on  the  distinct  sphere  of  communicative  interaction
(Habermas 1984, II:356). In regard to the second point, Habermas also endorses the claim that the
existence of modern moral discourse has to be understood in terms of a historical development –
not, as Marx argues, as a result of the division of labor, but as a result of a historical process of
rationalization and differentiation of value spheres.
Third,  even  though  Habermas  does  not  think  that  the  form  of  modern  morality  as  such  is
ideological, in his early work he at least suggests that specific attempts at discursive legitimation
can be ideological when they “do not articulate the power relationship whose institutionalization
they make possible.” (Habermas 1988, 172) If moral discourse is distorted by power relations that
cannot be thematized in it, it becomes ideological. While this is still in the spirit of Marx, Habermas
changes his view on this matter in his later work. He then comes to believe that the process of
communicative rationalization makes ideological domination infeasible. The function of ideology is
taken over by the colonization of the everyday substrate of communication by systemic imperatives
which leads to a fragmentation of every-day (moral) consciousness (Habermas 1984, 2:354f.). 
There  are  two  questions  that  remain  on  the  metaethical  level  that  are  not  entirely  solved  in
Habermas's theory: Although he rejects non-cognitivism because he holds that moral judgments
express beliefs for which justifications can be given, he still does not think moral discourse is truth-
apt. It is therefore not clear that he is a cognitivist in the full sense of the term (Finlayson 2005). Of
course,  this  does not  show that  Habermas would have anything to gain by moving towards an
expressivist model. But one could at least imagine an expressivist reformulation of Habermasian
constructivism that  takes moral  judgments  not  only as expressing the judgment that  something
ought to be done, but also as expressing one's commitment to second-order norms that delineate in
what ways one is open to engaging in a justificatory discourse about such commitments (for a
similar suggestion, see (Brandom 2000, 372).
Honneth: Morality as an Expression of Social Struggles
While Habermas has good reasons to reject an overly simplistic picture of moral discourse as a
mere  expression  of  social  domination  and  to  opt  for  a  more  complex  story  about  social
rationalization as the rationalization of discourses,  his  theory runs the danger of neglecting the
centrality of an important insight of Marx and Adorno for a critical theory. This insight is that the
discursive form of morality can itself be a source of social domination and that at least a specific
form of moralism can function as an ideology. 
It  is  in  this  context  that  Axel  Honneth's  theory  of  recognition  plays  an  important  role  in
contemporary critical theory. Honneth defends a still  different picture of the “social totality”. In
contrast to Habermas, he does not think that social interaction is subject to two conflicting forms of
rationalization. In contrast to Adorno and Horkheimer, he also does not think that society forms a
completely integrated totality.  Rather,  he sees society as essentially  fragmented and divided by
social struggles in which different self-understandings of social groups compete (Honneth 1993,
xviif.;  Honneth 1995). Such struggles are never purely animated by strategic self-interest.  Their
“internal grammar” can only be properly reconstructed if one sees that social movements are always
motivated by the perception of moral disrespect (Honneth 1992, 196). But Honneth does not take
this sociological fact to demonstrate that the idea of morality as such is ideological – rather the
opposite. For Honneth, moral expectations are irreducibly basic components of any social order.
Throughout  his  social  theoretical  writings,  Honneth  analyzes  moral  claims  as  expressions  of
legitimated social expectations that are grounded in basic social norms of mutual recognition. He
thereby embraces the original expressivist thesis of Marx, but not in the sense that the structure of
moral  discourse should be taken as  an expression of  the  structure  of  instrumental  cooperation.
Instead, he argues that moral judgments express  moral expectations that animate social struggles.
To get a clearer picture of the metaethical implications of this approach, I will briefly reconstruct an
early objection that Honneth raises against Habermas, before examining his discussion of “moral
realism” in the context of his theory of recognition and his more recent explicit engagement with
metaethical questions.
In an early article from 1990 (translated in Honneth 2007a), Honneth explicitly situates his theory in
the tradition of Marx, Adorno and Habermas who, he argues, bind the normative force of moral
arguments back to existing tendencies in social  reality.  In Habermas's  case,  this  basis  in social
reality  is  no longer  the working class  but  a  post-conventionally  socialized  cultural  avant-garde
milieu that has internalized the communicative presuppositions of a rationalized moral discourse
(Honneth  2007a,  81).  The  objection  that  Honneth  raises  in  this  context  intends  to  show  that
Habermas's theory of society leads him to systematically ignore other potential sources of relevant
moral claims. But with only a few adjustments, we can see that the same argument can also support
a critique of moralism in Marx's spirit.
Honneth  first  contrasts  two  forms  of  “morality”  that,  as  he  suggests,  can  be  found  in  the
consciousness of cultural elites on the one hand, and in the attitudes of members of subordinated
social  classes  on  the  other  hand.  While  the  first  kind  of  consciousness  features  “coherent  and
logically connected ideas of right and wrong” (Honneth 2007a, 84), the second kind “contains no
ideas of a total moral order or projections of a just society abstracted from particular situations, but
is instead a highly sensitive sensorium for injuries to what these masses take to be their justified
moral claims” (Honneth 2007a, 84). Part of the reason for this is that members of the oppressed
classes  are  less  subject  to  moral  pressure  to  present  their  moral  judgments  in  a  conceptually
elaborated form. However, they also are less in control of the symbolic social resources that are
needed to make discursively acceptable claims. This leads him to observe that a theory that focuses
primarily  on the  rationality  of  value  judgments  regarding the ability  to  make sense of  validity
claims (such as Habermas') will systematically exclude such moral judgments from consideration.
Honneth argues, in effect, that Habermas's discourse theory runs the risk of taking over the self-
understanding of a practice of morality that excludes certain normative judgments systematically
from consideration. This argument has a structural similarity to Marx's critique of moralism. But
while Marx argued that an essential feature of the form of moral thinking as such requires people to
make a  cognitive  error (to deny the practice-bound nature of their judgment), Honneth seems to
assume that a specific (mistaken) theoretical understanding of morality (that has social significance)
involves a moral error (as it illegitimately excludes moral judgment from the sphere of morality that
has not yet risen to the level of discourse). Honneth consequently does not develop this argument to
object  to  morality  as  such  but  as  part  of  a  defense  of  a  competing  understanding  of  moral
requirements.
This understanding is developed in his theory of recognition. According to this theory, the moral
self-understanding  of  any  given  society  develops  through  a  process  of  social  struggle.  These
struggles are the result of negative experiences of misrecognition and disrespect by members of
socially disadvantaged groups. Members of disadvantaged groups not only experience themselves
as excluded from relations of equal recognition by others, but they also become aware that the
dominant  moral  vocabulary  in  their  society  does  not  provide  them with  resources  to  draw on
principles that are already discursively accepted to make a claim to be treated more justly. As a
result, they engage in social struggles through which they aim at changing and enlarging the scope
of concern of the social norms of their society. On this model, the moral vocabulary that is accepted
in any given context expresses a commitment to historically specific norms that are the result of a
social  learning process. This means that the rebellion of subordinated groups against dominant,
explicit moral norms is motivated by implicit moral judgments that do not draw on moral principles
(and are therefore often mistaken for an expression of strategic self-interest) but rather on non-
inferential moral experiences. These experiences are not experiences of a reality of social facts that
is independent of society. Rather, they reflect a deeper level of the “moral grammar” of society, that
is, the constitutive dependence of human beings on mutual recognition for their self-realization.
While  Honneth's  reliance  on  Hegel  would  suggest  that  he  also  takes  over  the  expressivist
framework to which Hegel subscribes, in several articles he describes his metaethical commitments
as being close to the moral realism of John McDowell (Honneth 2007b, 335; Honneth 2002b, 517).
In particular, he wants to avoid a potential relativist conclusion that implies that  any  change of
moral norms that reflects some form of recognition of persons must count as moral progress as long
as  those  who  experience  it  find  it  agreeable.  This  would  make  the  problem  of  ideological
recognition  intractable  (Honneth  2007b).  To  rule  out  this  possibility,  Honneth  speculatively
embraces the idea that the historical change of moral norms that emerges as a result of struggles for
recognition is a learning process that reflects some kind of moral progress (Honneth 2007b, 335).
As he does not want to base his argument on a non-social version of moral realism, McDowell
seems a natural ally. In contrast to traditional realists, McDowell acknowledges that there is no way
of characterizing the moral without reference to our faculties of moral perception (McDowell 1998).
However, even such a judgment-dependent form of realism seems to be ill-suited for a project like
Honneth's, as it still suggests the realist idea that a moral learning process is more a discovery of an
already existing realm of truths than a construction of a moral standpoint. The idea of a revision of
morality based on the negative experience of subordinated groups seems to suggest that, rather than
a disinterested process of discovery, a moral learning process is better described as the result of
active  struggles.  In  fact,  this  is  an  objection  that  Honneth  himself  raises  against  McDowell
(Honneth 2002a). 
However, in a recent article Honneth has reversed his position on this matter (Honneth 2014). He
now endorses a Hegelian version of Kantian constructivism. Moral self-determination, he argues,
should be understood as a form of self-legislation. In contrast to the Kantian model,  such self-
legislation cannot start from zero. Rather, it can only be a matter of subjects taking up social rules
that  are  already institutionalized  in  a  practice  where  multiple  subjects  recognize  each other  as
competent authorities over the content of the norm. In addition, the respective practices must be
connected to the realization of desires and already endorsed values to develop any motivational
force. Nevertheless, in spite of its social grounding, this account is not a form of relativism. Not just
any  social  practice  will  do:  Honneth  assumes  that  the  very  project  of  engaging  in  normative
practices guided by mutual recognition will transform the desires and inclinations of its participants
by involving them in processes of perspective-taking. When the motivational efficacy of a given
practice depends on desires that are undermined by the engagement in mutual recognition, then this
practice will fade over time (Honneth 2014, 824). This evolutionary dynamics leads to a historical
development that emphasizes inclusion and individualization (Honneth 2003, 185). Independently
of whether this is convincing as a moral theory, it clearly marks Honneth's return to a metaethical
picture according to which moral judgments are not to be understood as describing an independent
state of affairs, but as expressing a speaker's commitment. The commitment expressed by moral
judgments must be understood not only as a commitment to a specific social practice but (in the
case of non-ideological moral judgments) also as a commitment to a policy of revising practical
rules based on insights furnished by one's taking of the other's perspective. We can combine this
newer expressivist view with Honneth's original idea regarding the negativity of misrecognition.
His remarks about misrecognition suggest that moral statements also typically express either the
acceptance  or  rejection  of  a  second-order  policy  regarding  whether  one  has  to  take  the  non-
inferential  perceptions  of  disrespect  of  one's  interaction  partners  seriously.  Of  course,  not  all
empirically existing systems of moral thought will include a second-order recognition of the value
of such perceptions, but the more a given society is capable of understanding itself as engaged in a
process of historical learning, the more weight it will ascribe to such considerations. Read this way,
Honneth's positive attitude towards modern morality is based on the same intuitions that we already
find in Marx's vision of a form of normativity that is conscious of its social embeddedness and
Adorno's  view of  negative  moral  experiences  as  granting  us  (defeasible)  knowledge  about  the
morally right. Of course, Honneth disagrees with both Marx and Adorno insofar as he does not
think that morality must be ideological under current conditions. However, this disagreement is not
to be located on a metaethical, but on a social-theoretical level. While Marx and Adorno assume
that the dominance of the second-order logics of ideology and identity-thinking are secured by the
very structure of capitalist society, Honneth assumes that such a logic, as far as it exists at all,
cannot be more than a temporary disruption of a historical process of struggle that tends towards
moral progress.
Conclusion
Throughout  the  discussion  of  the  metaethical  views  of  critical  theorists,  I  have  empathized  a
number of shared features: First,  their commitment to the claim that morality is connected to a
wider  context  of  social  practices  and  that  understanding  this  embeddedness  is  essential  for
understanding the meaning of moral statements and their aspiration to objectivity. Second, they all
reject relativism and subjectivism regarding the normative. Third, I have sketched different critiques
of morality as involving defective second-order commitments. It is apparent, however, that these
shared features only form the backdrop for deep disagreements about the function and viability of
morality as a form of thought and about the correct metaethical analysis of moral statements. But it
has perhaps also become clear that these disagreements are not based on different metaphysical or
semantic assumptions – as it is the case in the analytic debate. Rather, the social picture of morality
that critical theorists unequivocally endorse changes the terrain of the debate. Different metaethical
analyses in this  debate can be shown to depend on different  assumptions  regarding the correct
concepts  for social  analysis.  In particular,  the question of how far societies form an integrated
totality explains why Marx and Adorno endorse the claim that moral discourse depends on more
general  forms  of  interaction  and  that  the  ideological  features  of  moralism  must  therefore  be
explained by reference to defective forms of society, whereas Habermas, who rejects the idea of the
totality,  can  introduce  a  distinctive  logic  of  the  rationalization  of  communication  and  thus
understand ideological forms of morality as a separate problem from social pathologies. Similarly,
the question of non-inferential moral experience as something that constrains social and individual
self-legislation is answered in different ways by Marx, Adorno and Honneth. While Marx claims
that morality is overcome by a cognitive insight into the practice-bound nature of normativity in the
course of a revolutionary transformation of social life, Adorno believes that it is the resistance of the
non-subsumable parts of individual and social experience through which resistance to ideology gets
a foothold. For Honneth, negativity is finally always already essential for the social in the form of
social struggle.
Of course, these considerations move the debate away from concerns that are typically recognized
as belonging to metaethics. However, as soon as the overwhelmingly plausible premise of critical
theories is accepted, namely that morality is not only socially determined regarding its content, but
also a socially structured  form of thought,  any convincing metaethical account must answer the
question what  understanding of society it  presupposes.  If  such an attempt were to be seriously
undertaken by analytic metaethicists, they would not be able to ignore the insights that have already
been won during the hundred-fifty years of discussion of these matters by critical theorists.
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